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ABSTRACT
Norms are known to be a major factor determining humans
behavior. It’s also shown that norms can be quite effective
tool for building agent-based societies. Various normative
architectures have been proposed for designing normative
multi-agent systems (NorMAS). Due to human nature of the
concept norms, many of these architectures are built based
on theories in social sciences. Tipping point theory, as is
briefly discussed in this paper, seems to have a great poten-
tial to be used for designing normative architectures. This
theory deals with the factors that affect social epidemics
that arise in human societies. In this paper, we try to apply
the main concepts of this theory to agent-based normative
architectures. We show several ways to implement these con-
cepts, and study their effects in an agent-based normative
scenario.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Human societies are simultaneously frustratingly unchang-
ing and yet susceptible to “epidemics” that sweep across the
social fabric causing people to adopt previously rare prac-
tices. Tipping point theories attempt to explain the subtle
triggers behind these social processes. In 2000, Malcolm
Gladwell [25] produced a popular science book summariz-
ing three key factors which trigger tipping points: 1) scale-
free networks (the Law of the Few); 2) effective messaging
(the Stickiness Factor) and 3) environmental influences (the
Power of Context). This paper relates tipping point theory
to the process of norm emergence in multi-agent systems; we
propose that normative agent architectures can serve an ex-
cellent computational model for expressing many contagious
social phenomena, including tipping points and information
cascades.
Social norms are known to be a major factor governing hu-
mans’ behavior; unbeknownst to us, many of our everyday
behaviors are influenced by these implicit standards [10].
Various normative architectures have been proposed for de-
signing normative multi-agent systems (NorMAS) capable
of reasoning about norm adoption. Some of these systems
have been grounded in social science theory, but the aim of
many architectures is simply to effectively address standard
multi-agent system challenges, including agreement forma-
tion, coordination and conflict resolution [9].
Despite recent research progress in the area, the complete
life-cycle of norms is far from fully understood. The complex
nature of human decision-making makes comprehending the
rationale behind social interactions difficult, since people are
notoriously bad at self-reporting their motivations [15]. The
field of agent-based modeling aims to create agents in the
image of humans. These agents typically have cognitively-
inspired decision-making components, and are situated in
life-like scenarios. In both standard multi-agent systems
and cognitively-inspired models, existing social theories have
been employed toward the construction of normative models
[5]. Various stages of the norm life-cycle including recogni-
tion, adoption, compliance and emergence are often modeled
on similar concepts in social sciences.
This paper proposes a unified model of how norm emergence
in networked agent societies can be used to predict the ef-
fects of common tipping point triggers. Previous work on
norm emergence in networks has investigated the effects of
social network topology in static [34, 31] and also dynamic
networks [29]. Yu et al. [39] presented an evaluation of dif-
ferent learning methods on norm emergence in networked
systems. In our work, we simply employ network structures
as a medium to apply ideas from tipping point theory re-
lating to the Law of the Few. Therefore, the structure of
agents’ network is not of interest by itself, other than mak-
ing it congruent with human social networks. Our main
contribution is showing the role and significance of tipping
point principles in normative agent systems, and evaluating
the potential impact of this model on NorMAS design. The
next section provides an overview of related work in this
area.
2. RELATEDWORK
Hollander and Wu [24] refer to three categories of normative
studies in the social sciences: 1) social function of norms
[15], 2) impact of social norms [7], 3) mechanisms leading
to the emergence and creation of norms [14]. In the con-
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text of social function, norms are often concerned with the
oughtness and expectations of agent behavior; where ought-
ness refers to the condition where an agent should or should
not perform an action, and expectation refers to the behav-
ior that other agents expect to observe from that agent [13,
2]. An example of work belonging to this category is Boella
and Torre’s architecture containing separate subsystems for
counts-as conditionals, conditional obligations, and condi-
tional permissions [16].
Within the second category, social impact, norms are con-
sidered in terms of cost provided to or imposed on the par-
ties involved in a social interaction [4]. For instance, pun-
ishment and sanctions are introduced as two enforcement
mechanisms used to achieve the necessary social control re-
quired to impose social norms [33]. Here they demonstrate a
normative agent that can punish and sanction defectors and
also dynamically choose the right amount of punishment and
sanction to impose [12].
As noted in [24], the third category is concerned with the
how of norms more than the why. Relevant work in Nor-
MAS domain that falls into this category is divided into the
following groups [11]. The first group is composed of re-
search in which norms are practically hard-wired into the
system or dictated directly to the agents. In the second
set, norms emerge from social interactions among agents.
Sen and Airiau’s work [32] in which agent interactions are
modeled using payoff matrices, focuses on norm emergence
through social learning in agent societies. Conte et al.’s
EMIL was designed as an architecture for modeling norm
emergence [17]. The EMIL architecture includes a dynamic
cognitive model of norm emergence and innovation [6].
Much of the existing work in normative multi-agent sys-
tems explicitly or implicitly relies on social science theo-
ries [8]. In a recent work, some of the well-known theories
of philosopher David Hume were evaluated using an agent-
based model called HUME2.0 [17]. This work demonstrates
how social justice concepts can even emerge from heteroge-
neous agents that are not endowed with norm representa-
tions.
Self-determination theory is also referenced by some of the
normative works [3]. Here the focus is on the agents’ mo-
tivation and the extent to which the motivation is intrinsic
or extrinsic. Neumann studied existing normative architec-
tures to see how much they comply with self-determination
theory [27].
Practice theory is an example drawn from anthropology; this
theory describes how changes in the society are based on the
interactions between the human agents and social structure.
For instance, an agent-based model for energy demand and
supply social practices is presented in [1], which shows how
energy consumption norms form and evolve in urban soci-
eties. The next section provides background on tipping point
theory, primarily from a sociology perspective.
3. TIPPING POINT THEORY
The term, “tipping point” was initially coined in physics to
describe the situation in which the state of an object rapidly
changes from one stable equilibrium to another different
equilibrium. Morton Grodzins was the first to use term in
social sciences to describe an interesting phenomenon he ob-
served in the US cities, known as white flight [23]. His obser-
vation was that in some metropolitan areas the percentage
of African-American people would increase up to a certain
point. After that point, those with white ethnicity immi-
grated from those cities in large numbers. Thomas Schelling
presented the general theory of tipping, which describes how
individuals’ micromotives and microbehavior can aggregate
in the big picture [30]. The model of collective behavior
introduced by Mark Granovetter [22] uses thresholds to de-
termine the path of social events. This model was initially
used to describe how fads are created.
In normative studies, tipping points are usually denoted as
the point of maximum return at which time the behavior has
the highest level of acceptability from the population. For
instance, in a certain group of friends, the number of times
they shower in a week may vary, but a specific value has the
highest acceptability by group members as the conventional
pattern of behavior. In this paper, we study the impact of
Gladwell’s three factors on norm emergence in agent-based
normative systems and demonstrate practical ways to apply
this versatile theory.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
For our experiments, we employ the classic scenario, rules
of the road, that is frequently used to study normative be-
havior in multi-agent systems. In this scenario, there exists
a population of agents that do not have any preference to-
ward driving on the left or right side of a two-way road. No
rules or higher enforcement exist to determine the preferred
side. This scenario represents a two-action stage game that
models the situation where agents need to agree on one of
several equally desirable alternatives. The societal norms
that we would like to evolve are either driving on the left or
driving on the right [32].
In this scenario agents receive a fixed value reward and pun-
ishment based on the following payoff matrix shown in Ta-
ble 1.  
 
 
 
 left right 
left 1,1 -1,-1 
right -1,-1 1,1 
 
 
Table 1: Payoff matrix for rules of the road scenario
As Yu et al. [39] note, although this payoff matrix appears
simple, the coordination game poses a very challenging puz-
zle for human beings to solve efficiently. The game has two
pure Nash-equilibria: both agents drive left or both agents
drive right. Classical game theory, however, does not give
a coherent account of how people would play a game like
this. The conundrum is that there is nothing in the struc-
ture of the game itself that allows the players (even purely
rational players) to infer what they ought to do. In reality,
people can play such games because they can rely on some
contextual cues to agree on a particular equilibrium [38].
In similar studies on normative systems, usually the cumula-
tive payoff (reward) of the whole population of agents is used
as a measure of comparing various methods (see [32] and [39]
for examples). Instead, we opt to use the norm emergence
time for each method as an evaluation metric. This is func-
tionally equivalent since the payoff received by all agents
post norm emergence is the same, hence a method which
leads to faster norm emergence will also yield the higher
cumulative payoff.
5. KEY FEWMEMBERS
In this section, we study the effects of key members of an
agent society on the rate of norm emergence. These key
members are selected using standard heuristics for measur-
ing influence within a network; we evaluate the performance
of three centrality measures: degree, closeness, and between-
ness. Degree centrality measures the number of edges con-
nected to a node. Closeness is calculated based on the total
distance to all other nodes. Nodes with a high betweenness
centrality fall on a large proportion of the shortest paths
(geodesics) in the graph.
To model the characteristics of a real social network, we use
an algorithm introduced in [35] to create a synthetic network
which follows power law degree distribution and exhibits ho-
mophily, a greater number of link connections between sim-
ilar nodes.1 The network generator uses link density (ld)
and homophily (dh) to govern network formation. A simpli-
fied version of the pseudo-code for this method is shown in
Figure 1. For our model, we assumed predefined values for
ld and dh. The nodes of the graph represent the individu-
als (agents) in the simulation, who can be considered as car
drivers.
G = Null
repeat
sample r from uniform distribution U(0, 1)
if r ≤ ld then
randomChooseSource(G)
determineCandidateSink(dh,G)
pickSink() . based on power-law distribution
connect(source,sink)
else
add a new node to G
end if
until desired number of nodes added to the network
Figure 1: Synthetic friendship network generator
We use a weighted voting approach (also known as a struc-
ture based method) to determine an agent’s decision with
regard to its neighbors. The weight for each of an agent’s
neighbors is computed using a normalized value of that neigh-
bor’s centrality value as shown in Equation 1.
weighti,j =
Cj
ΣDegik=1 Ck
(1)
1Commonly described as “birds of a feather flock to-
gether” [26]
This equation shows the weight of the link connecting neigh-
bor j to node i. C refers to the corresponding centrality
value (degree, betweenness and closeness). Also, Degi de-
notes the number of neighbors for node i. The top 10 percent
of the population of agents with the greatest centrality val-
ues are assumed to be the key elements of a society. At the
beginning of our experiments, all of the agents follow a sin-
gle norm; in other words, all of them have learned (through
social learning [32]) to always drive on one side of the road.
In our implementation, each agent has a utility value defined
for each of four possible cases: Up-Left, Up-Right, Down-
Left and Down-Right, where Up and Down determine the
section of road, and Left and Right determine the direction
an agent drives. These values are updated while receiving
payoffs based on the matrix shown in Table 1.
In our experiments, we compare the penetration of norm
changing behaviors that emanate from key members of a
society vs. other cases. We compare emanation from the
top to emanation from the middle and bottom 10 percent
of the population. At the beginning of the simulation, the
agents (nodes) are ranked based on their centrality value to
determine the top, middle and bottom agents. The utility
value of these agents is kept fixed. Neighbors of these agents
continue updating their behavior until a new norm emerges
in the system. Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 show the
number of iterations required for each case to converge. The
population of agents contained 100 agents, and the reported
results show the average values over 20 runs.
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Figure 2: Average number of iterations until the emergence
of one norm, when using degree centrality to determine key
agents.
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Figure 3: Average number of iterations until the emergence
of one norm, when using betweenness centrality to determine
key agents.
The pattern observed in all of three cases was very similar.
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Figure 4: Average number of iterations until the emergence
of one norm, when using closeness centrality to determine
key agents.
When the norm propagation starts from the top 10% of the
population, the norm emerges much faster compared to the
other cases. Moreover, there is a fairly sizable difference
among top, middle and bottom agents. The magnitude of
difference between the top and middle 10% is more than the
difference between the middle and bottom. These results
are consistent with the role of connectors in tipping point
theory.
6. STICKINESS FACTOR
According to the tipping point theory, the extent and rate
of emerging social norms in a society is not only related to
the members of the society, but also related to the content
of the message. An effective message needs to be interesting
or “sticky” enough to remain in agents’ minds. This fac-
tor is almost completely independent of the society and its
structure, and is a property of the idea.
As Gladwell [21] points out, it is potentially very compli-
cated to determine if a certain message has the necessary
stickiness or not, but one characteristic that is usually com-
mon to sticky ideas is that it frequently returns to a person’s
mind. This could be in the form of a desire to sit and watch
a popular TV show every night, or in a more extreme case,
a clinical addiction to smoking or gambling. Conventional
marketing and advertising domains refer to this phenomenon
as rule of 27. According to this rule, a message (advertise-
ment) should be seen at least 27 times, if the message is
going to stick [28].
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Figure 5: Average number of iterations until the emergence
of one norm, when 2 out of 4 agents with fixed utility values
play twice with each agent that they encounter.
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Figure 6: Average number of iterations until the emergence
of one norm, when 2 out of 4 agents with fixed utility values
go (drive) faster.
In order to model this property, we assume that the stick-
iness is represented by the number of games that an agent
plays with another agent. Therefore a higher number of
games will result in the same effect as a stickier belief. In
our experiments, this idea is evaluated in two different ways.
The first way is to increase the number of games that a cer-
tain set of agents play. The second way is to have a certain
number of agents driving faster than other agents to be ex-
posed to more cars.
Figures 5 and 6 show results related to these two cases. In
both cases, we have our original 100 agents plus a group of
2 agents which have a fixed preference to drive on either the
left or right. In the first scenario, one group of agents plays
two games each time it encounters another agent. In the sec-
ond scenario, one group of agents moves faster. Both of these
scenarios lead to the same effect: increasing the number of
times that an agent is exposed to an idea. This simulates
the property of frequently returning to a person’s mind. In
both cases, when the stickiness factor is implemented, the
entire system converges to a single norm faster.
7. POWER OF CONTEXT
The third element of the tipping point theory refers to the
power of context. As Gladwell points out: it is possible to be
a better person on a clean street or in a clean subway, than
in one littered with trash and graffiti [21]. The idea is mostly
based on what known in criminology as the theory of broken
windows [37]. According to this theory, slight changes in the
environment could result in tipping effects over the whole
society.
In order to apply this part of the tipping point theory, we
use ideas from the methods for studying fads and cascading
effects in networks [36]. First, we build a network using the
same approach described in Section 5. Then, we assign a
threshold value for each agent. Similar to the probabilis-
tic information cascade models, if the cumulative value of
the perceived cascade is less than the threshold, nothing
will change. If it’s higher, the agent will change its cur-
rent behavior, which in our scenario would result in driving
on the other side of the road. Figure 7 shows the percent-
age of times that a norm emerged in the system for a set
of threshold values. The columns show the average results
over 20 runs. Agents were selected randomly as a source of
a small initial shock in the network, which results in negat-
ing the current payoff values for driving on each side of the
road. The frequency of shocks is determined randomly. The
system runs until it reaches some fixed iteration number
(50,000), unless a different norm is observed. This experi-
ment illustrates how minor shocks can shape a population
fad, resulting in a population-level behavior change. The
shocks (pulses) in this model can be viewed as any of the
small changes that tipping point theory predicts can result
in large changes in the whole society. According to the re-
sults presented in Figure 7, thresholds as small as 0.02 can
lead to the emergence of norms in the system in almost 5
percent of the experiments. The computed values for each
agent are compared to its tipping point value (normalized
between 0 and 1).
There is a second aspect to the power of context, which refers
to the number of people in groups. The Rule of 150 says that
the size of groups is a subtle contextual factor that makes a
big difference. This number is referred as Dunbar’s number
[18], after the anthropologist who originally proposed the
idea. In groups with fewer than 150 members, people will
cooperate relatively easily and rapidly become infected with
the community ethos. Once that threshold is crossed people
begin to behave very differently. 150 is our social chan-
nel capacity as determined on the basis of personal loyalties
and 1-on-1 contacts. Beyond the tipping point of 150 the
group dynamics simply become too complex. For the aver-
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Figure 7: Percentage of times that a norm emerges in the
population, when agents have different threshold values for
activating.
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Figure 8: Average number of iterations until the emergence
of one norm, when the network structure of agents follows a
power-law distribution and when the network is a complete
clique.
age person there are just too many relationships to manage.
The group then becomes divided and alienated, and usually
splits into two. Smaller groups have been shown to be more
effective at tasks than larger groups. This may be due to
biological limitations of humans which make it very difficult
for them to handle a larger community.
With the growth of virtual social media sites and the spread
of online groups, there has been renewed interest in eval-
uating the importance of this limit on Facebook [19], Mys-
pace [20] and within massively multiplayer online role-playing
games (MMORPGs). The pivotal issue here is that a person
cannot maintain a close relationship with all of the mem-
bers of a larger group which ultimately sabotages its suc-
cess. Having a direct connection with each member of the
group is a necessary component to having a positive social
relationship.
We propose using a clique structure to illustrate this idea.
In a clique each node has a direct edge to all of other nodes.
There are n∗ (n−1) edges in the resulting graph. We opt to
use a directed graph, as that seems to be the general assump-
tion for friendship networks. We compare the emergence of
driving norms in a network generated using the method de-
scribed in Section 5. It should be noted that having more
edges does not result in faster convergence. More connec-
tions makes the diffusion of ideas easier, while it makes it
harder for the agents to find an idea that all agents like.
In a clique structure the major voting approach and the
weighted voting approach (using the number of edges) are
the effectively same, so neither of them elicits earlier norm
emergence. Figure 8 shows the number of iterations that
were required on average for the two cases to reach norm
emergence. The driving norm emerged faster in case of the
clique structure than in the power-law degree distribution
network. This shows the potential benefit of such a struc-
ture in constructing agent systems, at least for ideal cases.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Norms are complex social behaviors that have been exten-
sively studied in sociology, psychology, and other related
fields. Most normative architectures draw upon theories
from the social sciences. The theory of tipping points has in-
spired much research in different disciplines. For this paper,
we model some of the well-known elements of this theory, as
applied to networked agent populations. We illustrate how
three of principle ideas including key few members, sticki-
ness factor, and the role of environment can affect the pro-
cess of norm emergence. This paper is meant to be an initial
step for convincing the NorMAS community of the impor-
tance of tipping point theory concepts. For future work, we
are interested in mapping the performance of our normative
model to a real-dataset.
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